Production Proof

Signed. Verified. Tamper-invalidated.

This page shows the production MCP/runtime proof path. For all live proof demos, open Live Proof.
Live Proof · Receipts · Verifier

CommandLayer’s production runtime emits canonical metadata.proof receipts that can be independently verified. If the payload changes, verification fails.

Run the verifier Explore capabilities

Proof outcome

STEP 1 SIGNED
Canonical receipt emitted

Runtime emits a canonical receipt.

STEP 2 VERIFIED
Verification checks pass

Verifier confirms hash and Ed25519 signature.

STEP 3 TAMPERED INVALID
Integrity failure detected

Changing the payload breaks the hash and signature.

Architecture flow

MCP client
→
mcp.commandlayer.org
→
runtime.commandlayer.org
→
signed receipt
→
/verify
→
VALID or INVALID

MCP bridges. It does not sign.
Runtime signs.
Verifier validates.
Tampering invalidates.

Canonical receipt example

{
  "verb": "sign",
  "class": "trust-verification",
  "result": {
    "payload": {
      "subject": "local-e2e-proof-flow",
      "message": "hello from MCP"
    }
  },
  "metadata": {
    "proof": {
      "canonicalization": "json.sorted_keys.v1",
      "hash": {
        "alg": "SHA-256",
        "value": "..."
      },
      "signature": {
        "alg": "Ed25519",
        "kid": "vC4WbcNoq2znSCiQ",
        "value": "..."
      },
      "signer_id": "runtime.commandlayer.eth"
    }
  }
}

Verification responses

Valid response

{
  "ok": true,
  "status": "VALID",
  "checks": {
    "hash_matches": true,
    "signature_valid": true
  }
}

Tampered response

{
  "ok": false,
  "status": "INVALID",
  "checks": {
    "hash_matches": false,
    "signature_valid": false
  },
  "errors": {
    "signature_error": "hash_mismatch"
  }
}

Run the proof locally

cd mcp-server
export COMMANDLAYER_RUNTIME_URL=https://runtime.commandlayer.org
unset COMMANDLAYER_VERIFY_URL
unset COMMANDLAYER_VERIFY_PATH
npm run e2e:local

Expected output:
STEP 1 SIGNED
STEP 2 VERIFIED
STEP 3 TAMPERED INVALID

What this proves

  • The receipt was produced by the runtime signer.
  • The verifier recomputed the canonical hash.
  • The verifier checked the Ed25519 signature.
  • Tampering changes the hash and invalidates the signature.
  • This is stronger than “agent says it did the thing.”

What this does not claim

  • This page is the production proof story, not the paste-and-test verifier.
  • /verify.html is the interactive verifier.
  • MCP is not the trust root.
  • Schema-valid alone is not verified.
  • Website /api/verify should not be overclaimed unless separately validated.